The Second
Treatise of Government
Chapter 3:
Of the State of War
John Locke
1690
Sect. 16. THE state of war is a
state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or
action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon
another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against
whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the
other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in
his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I
should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction,
For by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved, as
much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent
is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or
has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may
kill a wolf or a lyon; because such men are not under the
ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and
violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and
noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into
their power.
Sect, 17. And hence it is, that he who
attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put
himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a
declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that
he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy
to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power,
unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of
my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the
only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an
enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is
the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me,
thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of
nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that
state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every
thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest: As he that
in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to
those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take
away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of
war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man
to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared
any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get
him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him;
because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let
his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who
would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power,
take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him
as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e.
kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself,
whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference
between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some
men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will,
mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice,
violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to
judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or
a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no
common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war:
and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even
against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject.
Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having
stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but
of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation,
where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if
lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the
right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor
allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the
law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want
of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force
without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where
there is, and is not, a common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is
over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society,
and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the
law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past
injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the
state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to
appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to
the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the
aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may
repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the
future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies
open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a
barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or
injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to
imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is
used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it
is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences,
or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the
innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it;
wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the
sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to
the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war
(wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least
difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between
the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into
society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an
authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal,
there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy
is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any superior
jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and
the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he
was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he)
be judge this day between the children of Israel and the
children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and
relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and
therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall
be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every
one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge,
shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in
heaven. That question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another
hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha
did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own
conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of
all men.
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