The Second
Treatise of Government,
Chapter 12:
Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power
of the
Commonwealth
John Locke
1690
Sect. 143. THE legislative power is
that, which has a right to direct how the force of the
common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the
members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed,
and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time;
therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always
in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too
great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same
persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands
the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from
obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and
execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of
society and government: therefore in well ordered commonwealths, where the
good of the whole is so con sidered, as it ought, the legislative
power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they
have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws
they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that
they make them for the public good.
Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are
at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and
need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore
it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which
should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in
force. And thus the legislative and executive power come
often to be separated.
Sect. 145. There is another power
in every common-wealth, which one may call natural, because it is
that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered
into society: for though in a common-wealth the members of it are distinct
persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governed by the
laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make
one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state
of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies
that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it,
are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body,
engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this
consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in
respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
Sect. 146. This therefore contains the
power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions,
with all persons and communities without the common-wealth, and may be
called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood,
I am indifferent as to the name.
Sect. 147. These two powers, executive
and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet
one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the
society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other
the management of the security and interest of the public without,
with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are
always almost united. And though this federative power in the well
or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is
much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws,
than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence
and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public
good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being
to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is
to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left
in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power
committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the
advantage of the common-wealth.
Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive
and federative power of every community be really distinct in
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same
time, in the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the
force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to
place the force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate
hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed
in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public
would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other
to cause disorder and ruin.
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