The Second
Treatise of Government
Chapter 1
John Locke
1690
Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the
foregoing discourse, 1. That Adam had not, either by natural right
of fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such authority over
his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended: 2. That if he
had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: 3. That if his heirs had, there
being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is
the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and
consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined: 4.
That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the
eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost,
that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not
to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to
have the right of inheritance: All these premises having, as I think, been
clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should
make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that,
which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private
dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just
occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of
force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that
of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for
perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things
that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of
necessity find out another rise of government, another original of
political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that
have it, than what Sir Robert F[ilmer] hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may
not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power; that the
power of a Magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that
of a Father over his children, a Master over his servant, a Husband
over his wife, and a Lord over his slave. All which distinct powers
happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under
these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one
from wealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. Political Power, then, I
take to be a Right of making laws with penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of
property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of
such laws, and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury;
and all this only for the public good.
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