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Guide
to the Perplexed on Afghanistan
By Michael Radu
FrontPageMagazine.com
| October 16, 2001
AS
A STUDENT of
Afghanistan throughout the 1980s albeit from outside, since
I never traveled there and based upon all I have learned
from real experts who did, like David Isby and others, here is
my take on the commonly vented myths regarding Afghanistan and
future US policy toward it.
There are
a number of myths, some based on ignorance, some on malevolent
intention, regarding what we could, or could not, should or
should not do in Afghanistan.
Myth #
1 - The British (in 1840-42) and the Soviets (1979 - 1989),
both world empires at the time, broke their teeth in
Afghanistan. Hence, the US, today's dominant world power, will
suffer the same fate.
This is a
myth equally supported by the Taliban, some of their
not-so-well-disguised Muslim fellow travelers and useful idiots,
and, naturally enough, by the purposefully ignorant Western Left
fringes.
Reality
check
The
British in 1840 tried and failed to impose an unpopular puppet
king in Kabul, thus uniting all the fractious Afghans who, then
as now, could only be united against any effective central
government. Later on, the British realized their error and
engaged in a policy of manipulating (mostly with money) the
various Afghan groups, and did so successfully, as demonstrated
by the transformation of Afghanistan into an effective buffer
state (or, perhaps, better put, a buffer territory, since
"Afghanistan" was always, and still is a geographic
expression more than a real state, let alone a
"nation") between the competing interests and
ambitions of the British and Russian Empires.
The
United States in 2001 has no interest, capability or
geopolitical reasons to control, let alone occupy, Afghanistan
and unless we fail absolutely in our propaganda efforts, all
"Afghans" know it. Moreover, the recent (as in
"before the Soviet invasion of 1979") developments,
made worse by the incompetence of the Mujahedeen regime of 1992
- 1996 in Kabul, now represented by the "Northern
Alliance," have done what history has not done sharpen
ethnic divisions within the country, with Tadjiks, Uzbeks,
Aimaks, Hazaras , Turkmen together a majority, loosely and
temporarily "united" against the Pashtun-dominated
Taliban regime. It is no coincidence that the Taliban 's
political and ideological center is not multi-ethnic Kabul but
all-Pashtun Kandahar.
Myth #
2 - The terrain in Afghanistan is such that modern military
technology is largely irrelevant. The implications are 1) that
an almost Stone Age military would defeat a 21st century power,
and b) that the terrain is the same and equally important
everywhere.
Reality
check
The two
main reasons the Taliban did conquer so much of Afghanistan
since 1994 are the following:
- The
desire of many people, in fact most people, to have some
order and discipline imposed in their areas, as long as that
was not done by some foreign (e.g. Soviet) force. Simply
put, an end of banditry and warlord-ism, and the reason for
mass emigration to Pakistan. But consider Herats recent
history: under Ishmael Khan, a former Royal Afghan Army
officer, it successfully fought the Soviets, and since 1989
established an enlightened system in which girls and boys
had equal access to education; captured by the Taliban in
1998, and then escaping, Khan is now close to retaking the
city Afghanistan's most multicultural and historic.
Helping Ishmael Khan is helping everyone in Afghanistan.
- The
Taliban's ability to buy local military cum religious
leaders particularly in Pashtun and Nuristani areas.
With Al-Quaida and Pakistani help, that was doable; with no
more money flows from Islamabad, and Al-Quaeda now centered
on its own physical survival, the ability to buy local
warlords is limited at best and we could buy them
instead at least temporarily.
While a
lot of Afghanistan is mountainous and exceedingly difficult for
infantry operations, a look at the map would make it clear that
key areas the Uzbek border, the Shamali Plain north of Kabul
and the entire southeast around and including Kandahar, are
perfect operational areas for heliborn forces. These are also
the areas of major Taliban force concentrations. As for the
truly difficult mountainous regions, the worst of those, the
Badakshan Wakhan Corridor is under Northern Alliance
"control" whatever that means but certainly
not under the Taliban's; the strategic Panjhir Valley remains,
as ever, under Tadjik control, as is the entire area around
Herat. It is only in the mountainous East, around Jalalabad and
the Pakistani border that Pashtun ethnics may if the price
is right continue to support the Taliban cum Al-Quaeda
group. But would the latter have the money? Or the aura of
success following the US/British air attacks? Considering the
past, that is at best doubtful.
Myth #
3 -This is an irregular campaign the US is not prepared for
or competent to win.
We are
bombarded with analyses from former military officers, with no
experience in Afghanistan whatsoever, civilian analysts having a
hard time reading the maps of that country, and all-knowing
journalists. The general theory of those claiming that US forces
will be faced with an endless guerrilla campaign in the
mountains (see above) and plains of Afghanistan is based upon
the experience of the Soviets precisely the Taliban's main
ideological point and is all wrong.
Reality
Check
Unlike
the Soviets, whose support was limited to a very thin group of
urban intelligentsia and (Soviet educated and indoctrinated)
military officers vulnerable to communist atheistic and secular
propaganda, the present U.S. campaign does not try or claim any
cultural and religious (or anti-religious) goals. Hence the
moderate Northern Alliance and the Shi'I Hazaras see nothing
wrong with the U.S. Air Force being their Air Force against the
Taliban.
The
implications are obvious or should be to some of those
"experts." While U.S./British Special Operations
forces the British Gurkhas look very much like the central
Bamyan province's Hazaras may and should play a key role,
most of the hunting for bin Laden and his crowd most of whom
are Arab or other foreign fanatics will be done by Afghans
themselves once the Taliban loses control over the major
cities and regions. "Let a thief catch a thief" will
clearly apply.
A Taliban
guerrilla war? Where, if they are seen as losers and do not
enjoy Pakistani intelligence and military support, as they did
until recently?
With the
major air bases of Shindand in the West, Bagram in the Kabul
area, and Mazar e Sharif in the north out of commission already,
and some minor ones under anti-Taliban control already, U.S.
forces will have free access to operations throughout the
country.
Myth #
4 - It is impossible to find Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
This
theory is based on all the above fallacies. It assumes that Al-Quaeda's
Arab (or foreign) militants could find a refuge inside
Afghanistan, without the locals knowing their locations or
acting upon the usual Afghan dislike and suspicion of all
foreigners, or the more recent dislike of "Islamic"
foreigners.
Reality
Check
Any
Afghan worth his history and tribal traditions would join the
winners (i.e. the anti-Taliban forces); capture and/or kill bin
Laden if that makes him, or his group, very wealthy.
Finally,
where, and for how long, could a foreigner and his large group
of "Arabs" hide in a country where the population
wants international aid, money, and food, and is historically
xenophobic?
Myth #
5 - Since the Northern Alliance, though recognized by the
United Nations as the government of Afghanistan, is made up
largely of ethnic minorities, it cannot form a stable government
in Kabul. Hence there is no realistic, long-term alternative to
the Taliban. This is the Islamabad thesis but then Islamabad
is not exactly an objective observer.
Reality
Check
To begin
with, ethnic "minorities" (Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen,
Aimaks, Hazara and Nuristanis) make up a large majority of the
Afghanistan population the Pashtuns are under 40 percent -
the largest ethnic group but clearly a minority themselves. It
is true that, for Pakistan which has more Pashtuns than
Afghanistan does that is the key element. But for
Afghanistan?
Second,
the Pashtuns are not, pace Secretary Rumsfeld, "southern
tribes." They are, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, a people
separated by a common language. The Durrani confederation in the
east and south is the Taliban's power base, BUT and this is
a very large but the Ghilzai confederation in the east (with
Jalalabad its center) is unhappy with the Durrani/Taliban power
sharing arrangements. And they are equally represented in
Pakistan - hence Musharaff's admittedly daring challenge to the
Taliban.
The
former King Zahir Shah is a Pashtun and he is recognized
(probably temporarily, as all things are, and always will be, in
Afghanistan) and he could bring enough of his people around to
get rid of the bin Laden gang of foreigners . As usual, money
will talk also.
We should
consider all these facts in talking about Afghanistan the
chances
and probability
of success of our military action and in dealing with
nonsensical, a historical and ignorant arguments to the contrary.
Michael
Radu
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